NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Volume 9

Number 2

Article 6

Spring 1984

Corporate Financial Records and Internal Accounting Controls:
What Does SEC Expect of Audit Committee Members
Robert Jay Fortin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert J. Fortin, Corporate Financial Records and Internal Accounting Controls: What Does SEC Expect of
Audit Committee Members, 9 N.C. J. INT'L L. 291 (1983).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol9/iss2/6

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

COMMENTS
Corporate Financial Records and Internal
Accounting Controls: What Does the SEC
Expect of Audit Committee Members?
I.

Introduction

The potential liability of outside directors' of publicly held corporations has expanded dramatically since the late 1960's, largely as a result
2
of several important cases decided under the federal securities laws.
During that time, the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter

"SEC" or "Commission") 3 has become more and more concerned with
corporate governance, 4 and particularly with the role of the outside director, which the Commission believes is crucial to an effective corporate
structure.

5

Increasingly, the Commission has sought the aid of outside directors
in its efforts to protect investors. 6 Toward that end, it has strongly supported the creation of audit committees which are composed entirely of
outside directors. 7 According to the Commission, "[e]ffective audit comI The term "outside director" is used in this comment to denote nonmanagement directors, ie. those directors who have no connection with corporate management. Courts may use
"outside," "uninterested," or "independent" interchangeably when referring to nonmanagement directors.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 55-87.
3 The SEC is the federal agency responsible for the administration and enforcement of
the federal securities laws. See generally I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 129 (2d ed. 1961).
4 Former SEC Commissioner Sommer has stated:
[D]uring the early seventies deeper Commission concern with corporate governance became apparent. It has become increasingly clear that the Commission
is no longer content with its traditional role of abstention from interference with
corporate governance and is restlessly seeking to affect the manner in which corporations are governed, the relationships between their managements and shareholders, the constitution of their boards of directors, and the manner in which
various parts of the corporate community conduct themselves ....
Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 121
(Summer 1977). See generally Earle, Corporate Governance and the Outside Director - A Modest Proposal, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 795-99 (1979); Note, Safe Harbors and Stormy Seas: Trends and
Countertrends in Outside Director Liabihty, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359, 395-96 (1981).
5 See hfina
text accompanying notes 88-118.
6 See generally Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilit s: A Programfor the Excercise of
Due Care, I J. CORP. LAw 57, 71-73 (1975).
7 The SEC first advocated the use of audit committees in its report on McKesson & Robbins in 1940, after the Commission's investigation disclosed that the audited financial statements of McKesson & Robbins, a drug company listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
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mittees composed of independent directors are the best assurance that
meaningful internal controls will be established and enforced."", Moreover, in the view of a former Commission chairman, the heightened sense
of public responsibility which independent audit committees introduce
into corporate governance helps to insure that adequate attention will be
given to those problems in which the public shareholders have the greatest interest. 9 Indeed, the audit committee has become so well establishedl ° that the SEC staff has warned that "any company which has
chosen not to establish such a committee

. . .

should weigh carefully the

costs of such a decision in terms of liability and loss of control against the
reasons, if any, for not establishing an audit committee."'"
Despite its outward support for the establishment of audit committees, however, the Commission has provided almost no guidance as to
what it expects of audit committee members, either in terms of duties
and responsibilities, or in terms of the level of care, knowledge and involvement required. Thus, an outside director serving on the audit committee of a large publicly-held corporation may well wonder how he or
she would fare should the SEC find it necessary to investigate a problem
in the company's financial records or internal accounting controls. 12
contained approximately $19 million in fictitious assets, including $10 million of non-existent
inventories. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (December 5, 1940). The Commission renewed its endorsement in 1972, urging all publicly-held companies to establish audit committees "in order to assist in affording the greatest possible protection to investors who rely upon
• . .financial statements." SEC Accounting Series Release No. 123 (March 23, 1972). In 1974,
the Commission added a provision to Regulation 14A of the proxy rules which requires disclosure of the existence and composition of the audit committee or, if no committee exists, inclusion of a statement to that effect highlighting its absence. Id at 403-04. See SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 165, 5 SEC DOCKET 20 (December 20, 1974); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (item
8(e)) (1983). In 1977, the SEC formally approved the New York Stock Exchange policy requiring each domestic company with securities listed on the Exchange to maintain an audit committee of the board of directors. NYSE GUIDE (CCH)
24951-1; SEC Exchange Act Rel. No.
13146, 11 SEC DOCKET 7 (March 9, 1977). Finally, since 1973 the SEC has entered into a
number of consent settlements which have resulted in the creation of audit committees. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Mid Continent Systems, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,220 (D.D.C. 1983); SEC v. Killearn Properties Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH)
96,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,807 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Lums, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp.,
SEC Litigation Release No. 6054, 2 SEC DOCKET 13 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
8 See SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 17500, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,632H at 17,235
(January 29, 1981).
9 See Ferrara & Goldfus, The Government and Corporate Governance.- What it Hears and How it is
Responding, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Prac. Law Inst. 1979)(citing address by Chairman
Williams to the Institute of Internal Auditors (June 19, 1978)).
10 Eighty-four and one-half percent of the companies analyzed in a proxy data monitoring
program conducted by the staff of the SEC in 1980 had audit committees. STAFF OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, A RE-EXAMINATION
OF RULES RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN

THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY 488
(Comm. Print 1980)[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
I1IId. at 583.
12 The SEC has the power to conduct investigations of possible securities laws violations.
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This comment offers guidance to audit committee members who
face the prospect of such an investigation. 13 Its focus is not on the potential liability of committee members generally under state and federal
law, but rather on the SEC's expectations, specifically with regard to the
audit committee member's responsibility for the maintenance of corporate financial records and internal controls.
The discussion is divided into four parts. First, the tasks which the
SEC believes audit committee members should perform, and the specific
duties which it has assigned to audit committees in the past 14 are identified. Second, the potential liability of committee members generally
under the federal securities laws is summarized. Third, SEC administrative decisions and enforcement actions involving outside directors are examined in an attempt to ascertain the standard of care to which audit
committee members will be held by the Commission. Finally, the SEC's
interpretation of the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 197715 is considered, together with recent cases and administrative decisions under the Act, in order to determine what impact it has
on audit committee liability in the eyes of the Commission.

II.

SEC on the Functions of Audit Committees

In its July 5, 1978 "Report to Congress on the Acounting Profession
and the Commission's Oversight Role,"' 16 the SEC set forth the following
functions which it believes an effective audit committee should perform:
1. engage and discharge the auditors;
2. review the engagement of the auditors, including the fee, scope
and timing of the audit and other services rendered;
3. review with the auditors and management company policies
and procedures with respect to internal auditing, accounting
and financial controls;
4. review with the independent auditors their report, their perception of the company's financial and accounting personnel, the
See § 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1982); § 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982). See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 194575.
13 This comment is concerned only with the duties and responsibilities of audit committee
members and the standard of care to which they may be held by the SEC. For an overview of
the Commission's enforcement program and some insight as to how most effectively to represent
clients under SEC investigation, see Brodsky, Representing Clients i) SEC Investigations, 56 FLA.
BAR J. 345 (April 1981). For a more detailed treatment of the process and the issues which are
likely to arise, see Mathews, Litigation and Settlement ofSEC Administrative and Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 215 (1980).
14See infia text accompanying notes 46-54.
15 The accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982)),
specifically govern the maintenance of corporate books, records and accounting controls.
16 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

95TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND THE
COMMISSION'S OVERSIGHT ROLE (Comm. Print 1978)[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION'S
OVERSIGHT ROLE].
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cooperation they received during the audit, the extent to which
company resources were and should be utilized to minimize the
time spent on the audit, any significant transactions which were
unusual, any change in accounting principles or practices, all
significant proposed adjustments and any suggestions they may
have for improving internal accounting controls, choice of accounting principles, or management systems;
5. periodically review the company's code of conduct and investigate deviations from the policies therein;
6. meet with the company's financial staff at least twice a year to
review internal accounting and audit procedures and the extent
to which recommendations made by employees or by the independent auditors have been implemented; and
7
7. review significant press releases concerning financial matters.'
Less than two weeks after the SEC issued its July 5th report, it proposed an amendment to the proxy rules which would have indirectly
specified the duties which audit committiees would be required to perform.1 8 Although the proposed amendment did not require issuers to
discuss the functions of their audit committees, a note to the amendment
indicated the Commission's view that a statement that the company has
an audit committee connotes that the committee performs at least the
functions "customarily performed" by such a committee. 9 The "customary" functions of the audit committee, set forth by the Commission
in the note, included engaging and discharging the independent auditors, directing and supervising special investigations, reviewing with the
independent auditors the plan and results of the audit, reviewing the
scope and results of the company's internal auditing procedures, approving all professional services provided by the independent auditors prior
to the performance of the services, reviewing the independence of the
independent auditors, considering the range of audit and non-audit fees,
and reviewing the adequacy of the company's internal accounting control system.

20

Although the Commission made it clear that the note set forth only
some of the functions which it believed effective audit committees should
assume, 2 1 the note itself would have required issuers with audit committees that did not perform any one or more of the "customary" functions
to identify those functions not performed. 22 This proposal generated
17 Id

at 99-100.

18 See SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 14970, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.

(CCH)

81,645 at 80,580 (July 18, 1978).
19 Id
20 Id
21 Id at n.21. According to the Commission, it refrained from setting forth a more exhaustive list of functions in recognition of the fact that "the concept of the audit committee, its
characteristics, and the functions it ought to perform are currently developing in an evolutionary manner." Id
22 SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 14970, supra note 18, at 80,580. The Commission later
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considerable negative reaction, 23 leading the Commission to conclude
that a rule containing a "compendium" of customary audit committee
functions was inappropriate. 24 It remained concerned, however, that
disclosure of the existence of an audit committee would be meaningless
without some indication of the functions which the committee performed. 25 Thus, the amendment as adopted was revised to require a
brief description of the functions actually performed by the audit
committees.

26

The Commission backed down from its proposed negative disclosure
requirement on audit committee functions partly out of fear that defining the customary functions of such committees would inhibit their
evolution. 27 It is interesting to note in this regard that the "customary"
functions of audit committees contained in the proposed amendment
were narrower in scope than the functions which the Commission believed an effective audit committee should perform, as enumerated in its
report to Congress only two weeks earlier. 28 Although the Commission
was at first willing to trade a dampening effect on audit committee
evolution for the certainty of the minimum required functions in the proposed amendment, it later changed its mind, apparently in the hope that
audit committees would voluntarily perform the broader array of functions listed in the Commission's report to Congress. As a practical matter, therefore, audit committee members who are concerned about the
possibility of an SEC investigation may rest easier if the committee on
which they serve peforms at least some of the broader functions listed in
the Commission report.
With the stated purpose of "contributing to the ongoing evolution of
explained that the use of the negative disclosure approach in providing information on committee functions was "intended to shorten the required disclosures and to assure that boilerplate
disclosures are avoided." SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 15384, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,766 at 81,094 (December 6, 1978).
23 See SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 15384, supra note 22, at 81,094.
24 Id.at 81,095.
25 Id.
26 Id. In the interest of contributing to what it called the "ongoing evolution" of committee functions, the Commission instructed its Division of Corporate Finance to monitor proxy
disclosures made in response to the amendment as adopted. Id at n.18. The results of the
proxy monitoring program were made public in a 1980 report to Congress. See STAFF REPORT,
supra note 10.
27 See SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 15384, supra note 22, at 81,094-095.
28 Functions which the Commission believes an effective audit committee should perform,
but which were not listed among the "customary" functions in the proposed amendment,
include:
I. post-audit review of the company's financial and accounting personnel, significant unusual transactions, changes in accounting principles or practices, significant proposed
adjustments and the choice of accounting principles or management systems;
2. review deviations from the company's code of conduct;
3. meet with the company's financial staff to review accounting and auditing procedures;
and
4. review significant press releases concerning financial matters.
Compare COMMISSION'S OVERSIGHT ROLE, supra note 16, at 99-100 wih SEC Exchange Act
Rel. No. 14970, supra note 18, at 80,580.
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committee functions," 29 and also, perhaps, in an effort to satisfy itself
that the voluntary evolution of committee functions would in fact take
place, the Commission instructed its Division of Corporate Finance to
monitor the disclosures required by the new amendment to the proxy
30
rules regarding the functions which audit committees were performing.
After monitoring the information disclosed and surveying the commentators, the staff of the Division of Corporate Finance identified the
3
following functions of audit committees in a 1980 report to Congress: '
1. Selection of the Independent Auditor. The staff noted that participation in the selection of outside auditors has been called
"the closest thing to a universal function for all audit committees." '32 Furthermore, audit committees had an important role
to play in assuring the independence of the outside auditors.
The staff observed that commentators, as well as the Commission, had suggested that "[t]he audit committee must control all
services performed and the fees received by the auditors to in'33
sure that they are truly independent of management.
2. Review of Plan of Audit. The staff called this function "particularly important" because it is at this stage that the audit committee must assure itself that the audit will be adequate, and
that it will satisfy the requirements of the board as well as those
34
of management.
3. Review of Results of Audit. This is called "one of the most important" functions of the audit committee because it is at this
point, if not earlier, that the committee becomes aware of differences of opinion between accountants and management. The
staff stated:
To carry out its responsibility the typical audit committee -

even if it does little else -

needs to satisfy

itself that reported financial statements are accurate,
complete and not misleading .

. .

. To gain insight

into the auditors' relationship with management, special consideration might be given to areas where management and the auditors disagreed and how those
differences were resolved.

35

29 SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 15384, supra note 22, at 81,095 n.18.
30 Id The amendment, as adopted, is now Item 6(d)(1) of Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101 (1983).
31 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 496-506.
32 Id at 497 (citing J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES:

THE AUDIT

COMM1TTEE 14 (Conf. Bd. 1979)).
33 STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 498-99 (citing Accounting Series Release No. 264, 17
SEC DOCKET 13 (June 14, 1979); Greene & Falk, The Audit Committee- A Measured Contributhon
to Corporate Governance 4 Reahlstic Appraisal of its Objecttes and Functions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1229, 1242
(1979).
34 STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 499.
35 Id at 500 (citing J. BACON, supra note 32, at 22; Greene & Falk, supra note 33, at 1241).
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Commentators have also suggested that audit committees review the quality and depth of staffing in the company's account36
ing and financial departments.
Review of Internal Controls. According to the staff, this function is becoming even more important since passage of the For7

eign Corrupt Practices

Act.

3

5.

Review of Interim Financial Information. The staff noted that
some commentators had suggested the importance of this function, while others have expressed uncertainty due to the limited
scope of the interim review and the little time available between
3
preparation of the statements and their publication. 3
6. Review of Press Releases. To the extent that the audit committee is viewed as the overseer of the reporting of financial information by the company, the staff had previously stated that the
audit committee should review interim financial statements and
other significant press releases concerning financial information
prior to publication.39
7. Special Investigations.
8. Internal Audit Function. The staff noted that commentators
had suggested that the audit committee review the internal audit function just as it would review the independent audit. The
committee should meet with the internal audit staff and review
its systems and procedures, as well as the results of its internal
audits. "Essentially, audit committees are looking for indications of serious trouble when they review internal audit results.
They hope to catch potentially significant problems or deficien' 40
cies in time to deal with them before damage is done.
9. Review of Codes of Conduct. The staff noted that it had been
suggested that the audit committee establish and review the corporation's code of conduct to insure employee compliance with
4
the corporation's standards of ethical conduct. '
10. Providing Information to the Board.
According to the staff, the above functions are "illustrative of the
functions that boards of directors may consider in determining the responsibilities of their audit committees. '42 The staff noted that while the
list may change with the circumstances, certain functions, such as engagement of the independent auditors and review of the scope and result
of the audit, are probably so basic that they generally should be per36 STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 501. See Greene & Falk, supra note 33, at 14, 27;
COOPERS & LYBRAND, AUDIT COMMITTEE GUIDE (2d ed. 1979).
37 STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 502.

38 Id.
at 503 (citing COMMISSION'S OVERSIGHT ROLE, supra note 16).
40 STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 505 (quoting J. BACON, supra note 32, at 34).
39 Id

41 STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 508.
42 Id.
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formed by every audit committee. 43 In any event, it was "essential" that
committee members be given sufficient authority and specificity as to
their responsibility. 4 4 In the staffs view, the increasing popularity of
committee charters as a tool for defining audit commmittee responsibili45
ties was a favorable development.
In addition to the above statements on the functions of audit committees, the Commission has laid down directives on the duties of audit
committees in several consent decrees 46 in which defendants have agreed
to establish such committees. 47 For example, in SEC v. Kllearn Properties,
Inc. ,48 the company was ordered to establish an audit committee which
would have the following responsibilities:
i. It should review the engagement of the independent accountants, including the scope and general extent of their review, the audit
procedures which will be utilized, and the compensation to be paid.
ii. It should review with the independent accountants, and with
the company's chief financial officer (as well as with other appropriate
company personnel) the general policies and procedures utilized by the
company with respect to internal auditing, accounting and financial
controls. The members of the committee should have at least general
43 Id
44 Id.

at 496.
45 Id. at 483-84.
46
Consent decrees as a method of concluding litigation are viewed as a neces-

sity for the Commission, which has neither the time nor the resources to litigate
each case. They are also a speedy and efficient means by which to secure the
immediate cessation of illegal conduct and to impose the desired relief. For the
targets of the proceeding, there are many reasons to agree to a settlement. Early
settlements limit the extent of adverse publicity, avoid more detailed elaboration
of the proof underlying the charge (which would be presented, for example, in
support of a preliminary injunction), may provide the opportunity to negotiate
who is named in the injunctive decree, and preclude any possible collateral estoppel effects of the proceeding in future private actions. Additionally, because an
unsuccessful defense is not reimbursable from corporate funds, the targets have an
incentive to avoid costly litigation.

Although the decision to enter into a consent decree is an administrative act,
the entry of the decree itself is an exercise of judicial power. By approving the
consent judgment, the court is adjudicating the plaintiff's right to relief and its
extent, both of which are essential elements of any judgment. The court must be
satisfied that the decree is equitable, that it affords relief in the public interest,
and that the violation will, in fact, be remedied. Once there is consent to a decree, it can be attacked on appeal only on the grounds of fraud, lack of actual
consent, or lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the court entering the decree.
That a remedy could not be imposed if the case were litigated is not ground for
appeal. Finally, it is extremely difficult for the defendant to secure modification
of the decree once it is entered.
Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1192-93
(1975) (citations omitted).
47 See, e.g., SEC v. Mid Continent Systems, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.

REP. (CCH) 99,220 (D.D.C. 1983); SEC v. Killearn Proberties, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

94,807 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Lums, Inc., [1973-

1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

94,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For a critical discus-

sion of the SEC's use of court-appointed directors and committee mandates, see Note, The SEC
and Court-Appointed Directors. Time to Tailor the Director to Fit the Suit, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 507
(1982).
48 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
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familiarity with the accounting and reporting principles and practices
applied by the company in preparing its financial statements.
iii. It should review with the independent accountants, upon completion of their audit, (a) any report or opinion proposed to be rendered
in connection therewith; (b) the independent accountant's perceptions of
the company's financial and accounting personnel; (c) the cooperation
which the independent accountants received during the course of their
review; (d) the extent to which the resources of the company were and
should be utilized to minimize time spent by the outside auditors; (e)
any significant transactions which are not a normal part of the company's business; (i) any change in accounting principles; (g) all significant adjustments proposed by the auditor; (h) any recommendations
which the independent accountants may have with respect to improving
irternal financial controls, choice of accounting principles, or management reporting systems.
iv. It should inquire of the appropriate company personnel and
the independent auditors as to any instances of deviations from established codes of conduct of the company and periodically review such
policies.
v. It should meet with the company's financial staff at least twice
a year to review and discuss with them the scope of internal accounting
and auditing procedures then in effect; and the extent to which recommendations made by the internal staff or by the independent accountants have been implemented.
vi. It should prepare and present to the company's board of directors a report summarizing its recommendation with respect to the retention (or discharge) of the independent accountants for the ensuing year.
vii. It should have the power to direct and supervise an investigation into any matter brought to its attention within the scope of its duties (including the power to retain outside counsel in connection with
any such investigation).
In addition, the Audit Committee shall be given the following special duties, functions and responsibilities:
viii. review, either by the Committee as a whole or by a designated member, all releases and other information to be disseminated by
Killearn to press media, the public, or shareholders of Killearn which
concern disclosure of financial conditions of and projections of financial
conditions of Killearn and its subsidiaries;
ix. review of the activities of the officers and directors of Killearn
as to their future dealing with the company and take any action the
Committee may deem appropriate with regard to such activities;
x. approve any settlement or disposition of any claims or actions
from causes of action arising after the date hereof or any litigation now
pending which Killearn may have against 4any
past or present officers,
9
directors, employees or controlling persons.
The list of audit committee functions in Killearn is the most extensive the Commission has ever caused a court to set forth in a consent

decree. As a settlement, however, it is binding only on the defendant. 50
Furthermore, the relief requested by the Commission in Killearn was re49 Id at 92,695.
50 Moreover, since most of the SEC's cases conclude with settlements, it is unclear whether
a court, in a contested case, would find that the relief the Commission has been securing
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medial. It is uncertain whether the SEC would insist upon such an extensive list as a prophylactic measure. 5' Nevertheless, as one former SEC
Commissioner has stated, Killearn does provide "significant insights into
'52
the Commission's conception of audit committee duties in general."
Indeed, the audit committee functions listed in the Commission's July
1978 report to Congress53 appear to have been taken nearly word for
word from Killearn 54 lending strong support to the argument that the
Commission fully expects audit committees to perform more than the
minimum "customary" functions.

III. Committee Member Liability Generally Under the Federal
Securities Laws
The standard of liability for audit committee members as such
under the Federal Securities laws has never been considered by a court,
either with regard to recordkeeping, accounting controls or otherwise.
As a general rule, however, outside directors who are more deeply involved in the activities giving rise to the litigation, or who have more
knowledge and expertise than other outside directors, will be held to a
higher standard of care than other outside directors. 55 Although the
standard varies somewhat with the statute at issue, directors who serve
on a committee of the board may expect to be held to a higher standard
of care with respect to matters within the scope of their committee's du56
ties than outside directors who are not members of that committee.
through settlements is appropriate. Sommer, supra note 4, at 129. This comment is concerned
only with the SEC's standards; not with the enforceability of those standards.
51 Even in the remedial context the Commission rarely enumerates the entire list of functions which it might expect the audit committee to perform. Instead, it focuses on the weakness
or wrongdoing which has been discovered and tailors its relief to the specific problem it seeks to
remedy. For example, in SEC v. Marlene Industries Corp., 17 SEC DOCKET 406 (Lit. Rel.
8733)(S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1979), a case involving the payment of undisclosed benefits to corporate officers, the audit committee was ordered only to adopt internal control guidelines for the
authorization and disbursement of funds. Similarly, in In the Matter of Hycel, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 14981 [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,676 (July 20,
1978), the audit committee's sole specifically enumerated function was to make a periodic review of the company's compliance with written corporate policies governing personal charges
and travel and entertainment expenses. Id at 80,731.
52 Sommer, supra note 4, at 132-33.
53 See COMMISSION'S OVERSIGHT ROLE, supra note 16.
54 Compare id.at 99-100 with [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

96,256 at 92,695.
55 See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
There is little question that the SEC attempts to hold outside directors to a higher standard of
care than do the courts. This comment merely summarizes some of the more important cases in
order to provide a basis for comparison with the Commission's views which are discussed in/ia.
See text accompanying notes 88-118. For a more detailed discussion of the standard of care
applied to outside directors under the federal securities laws generally, see Note, supra note 4, at
365-87; Goldstein & Shepard, Diectors Duties and Liabiities Under the Securities Acts and Corporation
Law, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 759, 763-73 (1979).
56 See Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 273
N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. Onandoga Cty 1966) (applying state law). Although no other recent cases
were found in which the standard of care for committee members was discussed, the rule expressed in Syracuse Televisi n follows logically from the general rule expressed in BarChris, 283 F.
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In Escot v. BarChris Construction Corp. ,57 the first important modern
federal case to consider the standard of liability for outside directors
under the securities laws, the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected the "due diligence" defenses of three
outside directors who had been charged with violating Section 11 of the
1933 Act.5" The court found that all three of the outside directors had
failed to use reasonable care to investigate the facts and had relied too
heavily on the company's management and independent auditors. One
outside director, an attorney who was involved in the actual drafting of
the registration statement, was held to an even higher standard. According to the court, "[a]s the director most directly concerned with writing
the registration statement and assuring its accuracy, more was required
of him in the way of reasonable investigation than could fairly be ex59
pected of a director who had no connection with this work."
The duty of the outside director-attorney in BarChris can accurately
be described as a duty to discover. The court acknowledged that "[t]o
require an audit would obviously be unreasonable," 6 but in this case the
court felt there were errors and omissions which could have been uncovered without an audit. "The question is whether, despite his failure to
detect them, [the outside director-attorney] made a reasonable effort to
that end. ' '6' The court concluded that even if the outside director-attorney had been deliberately misled by BarChris's officers and had honestly
believed that the registration statement at issue was accurate, he "failed
to make an inquiry which he could easily have made which, if pursued,
'62
would have put him on his guard.
First, with regard to the duty to investigate, the reasonableness of
the investigation should depend on the outside director's access to information. For example, participants in the drafting of a registration statement clearly have access to more information than do nonparticipants;
thus, a "reasonable investigation" by a participant director must be more
extensive. 6 3 Second, once the duty to investigate is met, the quality of the
investigation must be measured to determine whether the outside direcSupp. 643, that outside directors who are more involved in the area of the business where the
problem arises will be held to a stricter standard of liability. See also Feit v. Leasco Data

Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 197 1)(outside director who was
"intimately involved" in registration process held to same high standard of liability as inside
directors).

57 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
5a Section II of the Securities Act of 1933 provides a cause of action against directors of an
issuer (among others) on behalf of purchasers of the issuer's securities who relied on any untrue
statement or ommission of a material fact in the registration statement. Se 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
The principal defense available to directors under § II is that they excercised "due diligence,"
as defined in the statute, in meeting the registration requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3).
59 283 F. Supp. at 690.
60 Id
61 Id.
62

Id. at 692.

63 See Note, supra note 4, at 470-71.
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tor discovered what he should have discovered given the information he
obtained.

64

Technically, the standard of care imposed in BarChris applies only
to suits brought under Section 11 of the 1933 Act, and audit committee
members can take comfort in former Commissioner Sommer's observation that the case "imposes an excessively strict obligation on the outside
directors." '65 Nevertheless, the reasoning the court used to impose a
higher standard of care on the outside director-attorney would apply
outside the Section 11 context. Audit committee members clearly have
access to more information regarding the corporate books, records, and
internal controls than do noncommittee members; thus, a "reasonable
investigation" of such matters by an audit committee member must be
more extensive than a similar investigation conducted by other outside
directors.
In Lanza v. Drexe[,66 a landmark case involving the liability of
67
outside directors under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act,
the Second Circuit held that an outside director who had not participated in any purchase negotiations owed no affirmative duty to investigate or ascertain whether all material adverse information about his
company was disclosed to prospective stock purchasers. 68 According to
the Lanza court, the outside director's liability, if any, must be that of an
aider and abettor, a conspirator, or a substantial participant in the fraud
perpetrated by others. 69 Thus, the outside director had only an obligation to avoid a "willful or reckless disregard for the truth. '70 In the
court's view, this meant that the outside director must not know of the
misstatements or omissions, or fail or refuse to investigate when "put on
notice," if such investigation can be undertaken "without an extraordinary effort."

'7 1

The Lanza court believed that the proper role of the outside director
was to supervise management's performance, which necessitated "balancing skepticism towards management's assessment of its performance
with trust in its integrity and competence. ' 72 As the SEC stated in its
amicus brief:
Corporate directors are not normally involved in the day-to-day
64 Id

65 Sommer, Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, [1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.

REP. (CCH) 79,660 at 83,804.
66 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1977).
67 Section 10(b) is the general antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful (a) to employ any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud, (b) to make untrue statements or ommissions of material facts, and (c) to
engage in any act or practice which would operate as a fraud or deceipt in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
68 479 F.2d at 1289.
69 Id.

70 Id.at 1306.
71 Id at 1306 n.98.
72 Id at 1306.
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conduct of the company's affairs. Except in unusual circumstances, they
are not expected to, nor do they, participate directly in the implementation of corporate policies. Routine managerial tasks are performed by,
and are the responsibility of, the operating officers. Directors have a
right to rely on the officers
of the corporation to perform their functions
73
in a lawful manner.
If the standard of care imposed on the outside director in Lanza is
less strict than that imposed in BarChris, it may be explained in part by
the fact that Lanza involved negotiations carried out by management,
while the registration statement in BarChris was issued by the board of
directors.74 Moreover, the outside director in Lanza was uninvolved in
the negotiations, and thus without access to information which would
75
have put him on notice of the need to further investigate.
The Lanza rationale was followed in Hamilton Bank and Trust Co. v.
Ho/li day 7 6 which involved alleged violations of several provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts, including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Hamil-

ton court stated that as a practical matter it was unrealistic to require
outside directors to investigate the corporation's incidental securities
transactions 77 which were carried on or participated in by the corporation's officers without the directors' actual knowledge or participation. 78

According to the court, an outside director is chargeable only with the
degree of knowledge which the corporate books and records and the directors meetings would fairly disclose. 79 Directors are entitled to rely on
the corporation's officers, and are "not required to presume rascality,
maintain a constant vigilence over the corporation's business transactions, or assume the responsibilities of the corporation's managing
officers."8 0
73 Id
74 See Note, supra note 4, at 377.
75 Id Any further differences between the standards imposed in the two cases are most
likely explained by the fact that they arose under different sections of the securities laws. Id at
377-78. See also Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972)
(negligence is the standard for liability under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act).
76 469 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
77 Id at 1242. The securities in question were sold by a subsidiary of the company on
whose board the outside directors sat. Id
78 Id.
79 Id
80 Id

(quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). See also Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982)(no duty imposed
on outside director [under § 10(b)] to insure that all material adverse information about the
corporation was conveyed to prospective purchasers); In re Investors Funding Corp Securities
Litigation, Bloor v. Dansker, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,238 at
96,031 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Although the responsibilities imposed upon outside directors.., are
not stringent, it is clear that . . . they should supervise the performance of management. Thus,
any management malfeasance was a direct, and not an unforseeable, consequence of the directors' neglect of their directorial responsibilities," but scienter is a necessary element of the
§ 10(b) claim); Greene v. Emersons, Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 66, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(outside director's
failure to discover the improprieties of a corporation's officers, even if such behavior could be
characterized as "reckless," does not constitute scienter which, under those circumstances, requires something closer to actual intent to defraud).
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Hloliday, like Lanza, does not affect the BarChrits principle that the
more involved an outside director is, the higher his standard of care.
Both Holi'day and Lanza simply held uninvolved outside directors to a
lower standard than did BarChris. The uninvolved outside directors in
Lanza were held responsible only for those developments which came to
their attention, and then only to the extent that any investigation could
be accomplished without "extraordinary effort." 8' Similarly, in Holliday,
the outside directors were expected to know only what the corporate
books and records and the directors meetings would "fairly dislose. ''8 2 In
BarChris, on the other hand, even the uninvolved outside directors were
charged with an affirmative duty to investigate the facts. 8 3
As previously mentioned, 84 the difference between the strict standard imposed in BarChris and the lower standard of Lanza and Holiday
may well be attributable to the difference between the statutory sections
under which the cases were brought. 85 Whatever the standard of care
imposed on uninvolved outside directors, however, BarChr's stands for the
proposition that the standard for ivolved outside directors will be
higher.8 6 An audit committee member who does not actually participate
in activities which affect corporate books, records or internal controls
may find himself in the unique position of being less involved than an
outsider, yet more involved than other outside directors, simply by virtue
of his committee membership. 87
IV.

SEC Reports, Enforcement Actions and Administrative
Proceedings

A former SEC Commissioner has commented with regard to proposed guidelines for corporate directors, that "although contributions to
clarity and certainty can be made with respect to such concepts as 'mate81 479 F.2d at 1306 n.98.

82 469 F. Supp. at 1242.
83 283 F. Supp. at 688-89.
84 See supra note 75.
85 BarChris involved § 11 of the 1933 Act, which imposes strict liability on directors, See
supra note 58. Lanza involved § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, seesupra note 67, which the Lanza court
interpreted to require "willful or reckless disregard for the truth .... " 479 F.2d at 1306. The
United States Supreme Court has since determined that scienter is required under § 10(b). See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
86 Se supra text accompanying notes 57-65.
87
The existence of an Audit Committe may lead, in effect, to three different
standards of liability. At one extreme, inside directors will be held as always to
the highest standard of liability. At the other extreme, outside directors who do
not serve on an Audit Committee will continue to be subject to a lower standard
of liability. By virtue of the knowledge of corporate affairs which they acquire, or
are expected to acquire, as a result of their membership on the Audit Committee,
outside directors serving on the Committee may be held to a higher standard
than outside directos not serving on the Committee; but the standard of Committee members will probably be lower than that of the inside directors who, because
of their day-to-day involvement with the operations of the company, have even
greater knowledge of corporate affairs.
Green & Falk, supra note 33, at 1247-48.
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riality' and a director's 'due care,' such concepts cannot be reduced to a
'a
8
rule of mathematical precision without doing more harm than good."
Implicit in this statement is the realization that a director's duty of care
in any given situation depends on the circumstances of the particular
case. Unfortunately, the SEC has never focused on the standard of care
for audit committee members as such in any of its reports, enforcement
actions or administrative proceedings. Some useful guidelines have
emerged, however, from the few cases in which the Commission has considered the outside director's duties and liabilities.
The Commission's investigation and Report to Congress on the Financial
Collapse of the Penn Central Company8 9 has been called a "turning point" in
the SEC's policy on the role of directors. 9° According to the staff report,
the directors of Penn Central were accustomed to a "generally inactive"
role in their respective positions as directors of the Pennsylvania and
New York Central Railroads. 9 1 They relied on oral descriptions of company affairs both before and after the merger of the two companies
which formed Penn Central, and failed to fully comprehend the details
92
of the merger, or the fact that it had not been adequately planned.
Moreover, they did not demand or receive information which was essential to understanding the company's position or management performance, and had deliberately avoided confrontations with management on
issues critical to testing the integrity of management and providing adequate disclosure to shareholders. 9 3 The staff concluded that a proper inquiry would have uncovered improprieties and the "concomitant need to
provide full and adequate disclosure . . . . -94 Instead, the directors had
permitted management to run the business without any effective review
or control and had remained uninformed throughout the entire series of
important events.
According to the SEC staff, the Penn Central Board had failed in
two principal ways; it had failed to establish procedures, including a flow
of adequate financial information, to allow the directors to understand
what was happening and to enable them to exercise control over management's conduct, and it had "failed to respond to specific warnings
about the true condition of the company and about the questionable
88 Address by SEC Commissioner Garrett, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 79,623 (January 16, 1974).
89 STAFF OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 92D CONG.,

2D SESS., SE-

CURITIES AND EXCANGE COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE

OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY (Comm. Print 1972)[hereinafter cited as PENN CENTRAL
REPORT].

90 See Sporkin, SEC Enforcement and the Corporate Board Room, 61 N.C.L. REV. 455, 455

(1983).
91 SEC STAFF STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY,
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL, INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.

SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,931 at 82,012 (August 3, 1972).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 82,012-013.
94 Id. at 82,013.
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conduct of the most important officers." '9 5 As a result, Penn Central's
investors had been deprived of adequate information about the condition
96
of the company.
There is no evidence in the Penn Central report to indicate that Penn
Central's outside directors had been deliberately deceived by the company's officers and inside directors. Rather, in the face of the dramatic
change in the complexity of corporate matters as a result of the merger
and diversification efforts, the board had simply failed to effectively
monitor the company's management. Presumably, the "specific warnings" to which the staff refers are the numerous indications of critical
operating and financial problems surrounding the merger which must
have reached the outside directors despite their inactive role. Also, the
directors had been made aware of a lawsuit alleging improper and unlawful conduct on the part of the chief financial officer of Penn
Central.

97

The Penn Central report indicated that outside directors have an affirmative duty to establish procedures to ensure that they receive adequate financial information. In addition, the standard of care to which
outside directors would be held, and presumably the amount of information which might be considered "adequate," changed with the circumstances. Dramatic changes or times of stress in the company's existence
required particular vigilence on the part of the outside directors, while
business as usual required less active involvement. Under no circumstances, however, were the outside directors entitled to rely completely
on management. The only question was how much affirmative action
was required.
Not all of the actions taken by the Commission involving outside
directors have involved wrongdoing as obvious as that in the Penn Central
report. In Report of the Investigation in the Matter of Sterling Homex Corp. ,98
for example, the Commission noted that Sterling Homex's outside directors had been deliberately deceived by management. Despite the deliberate deception, however, each of the outside directors possessed considerable business experience and sophistication, and, according to the
Commission, should have played a more significant role in the company's affairs. 99 Instead, board meetings had been perfunctory and conducted without a written agenda; in fact, they were often conducted by
telephone, and rarely included discussion or interrogation of management. No committees were formed to help the board perform its responsibilities, or to receive, solicit, or evaluate information from management.
The outside directors were not given, and never obtained, timely, accurate or complete information with respect to such matters as backlogs,
95 PENN CENTRAL REPORT, supra note 89, at 287.

96 Id

Id at xiii.
98 11975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97

99 Id at 85,462.

80,219.
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aging of receivables, cash flow needs, or problems relating to completion
of contracts. As a result, they "could not and did not make probing inquiries regarding those matters."100
Sterling Homex's directors relied on the fact that the company's independent accountants had accepted the company's accounting practices
as being in conformance with generally accepted principles. Thus, they
made no significant effort to analyze or familiarize themselves generally
with the accounting practices, which led, in the Commission's view, to
their failure to understand the implications of those practices and their
susceptibility to abuse.101

Beyond the somewhat vague statement that an outside director
must obtain a sufficient grasp of the business and accounting practices to
enable him to make "informed judgments," there is no indication in the
Sterling Homex report of exactly how much knowledge the Commission
expects outside directors to possess. It is safe to assume, however, that if
outside directors are expected to make "probing inquiries" into such
matters as backlogs, aging of receivables, and cash flow needs, they must
have at least a basic understanding of accounting and business
practices. 102
Another question left unanswered by the Sterh'ng Homex report is the
extent to which outside directors may rely on the independent auditors.
According to the Commission, the outside directors' reliance in this case
was "understandable," but it was apparently not acceptable to the extent
that it led the outside directors to make to no "significant effort" to familiarize themselves with the accounting practices being used. Presumably, had the Sterling Homex directors been knowledgeable with regard
to the practices employed by the accountants, they would at least have
been aware of the need for greater scrutiny.
It is clear from the Penn Central and Sterling Homex reports that the
SEC expects outside directors to play an active role; especially during
critical moments in the company's existence. 103 The Commission
100 Id at 85,461.
1o Id at 85,462-463.
102 In SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977), the Commission stated that the members of an audit committee which Killearn had agreed to establish as part of a consent decree should have "at least
general familiarity with the accounting and reporting principles and practices applied by the
company in preparing its financial statements." Id at 92,695.
103 Many of the major SEC reports, enforcement actions and administrative proceedings
involving outside directors have also involved companies experiencing what could be called
"critical" moments in their existence. In the Penn Central report, for example, the company had
just completed a major reorganization and was facing imminent bankruptcy, see [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,931, while in the Sterling Homex report the
company had recently been engaged in two public offerings and was also sliding toward bankruptcy. See [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219. See also In the
Matter of National Telephone Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,410 (January 16, 1978)(company faced series of serious financial difficulties, eventually leading to bankruptcy); SEC v. Shiell, SEC Litigation Rel. No. 7763, 11 SEC DOCKET 10 (January
31, 1977)(company involved in public offering).
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stressed, however, that its Sterling Homex report was not intended to pro10 4
mulgate guidelines with respect to the duties of outside directors.
Rather, it simply illustrated a situation where outside directors "did not
provide the shareholders with any significant protection in fact, nor did
their presence on the board have the impact on the company's operations
10 5
which shareholders and others might reasonably have expected."'
Thus, the Commission viewed the concept of "reasonable expectations"
as critically important in determining the extent of an outside director's
duties and liabilities. 106 Undoubtedly, investors expect their outside directors to be informed, not to be mere figureheads; to ask pertinent,
probing questions, not simply to accept answers on blind faith. It follows
that although audit committee members have never been singled out in a
Commission report or proceeding, they are likely to be held to a very
high standard, at least as to matters within the scope of their responsibility, where investors and others might reasonably expect them to be informed and actively protecting the investors' interests.
In In the Matter of National Telephone Company, 107 the SEC concluded
that the outside directors had a duty to see to it that proper disclosures
were made when they were aware that the optimistic nature of the company's public disclosures were in direct contrast with the true state of the
company's affairs. 10 8 The Commission stated expressly that it was "not
saying that the directors of a company are responsible for approving
every line of every press release and periodic filing made by the company."' 1 9 Rather, during troubled times in the company's existence, the
directors have an affirmative duty to assure that investors are provided
with accurate and full disclosures concerning the basic viability of the
company and its prospects for continuing operation. 110
The outside directors in National Telephone had taken no part in the
preparation of the misleading disclosures, but like the outside directors in
the Penn Central and Sterling Hlomex reports, they all had "extensive experience in financial and business matters" and should have been aware of
Though aware of the facts, howthe need for corrective disclosure."I'
ever, they took no meaningful steps to see that adequate disclosures were
made. No board meetings were held during a "most critical" time for
the company, and the outside directors did nothing effective to insure
that they were provided adequate, current information. In fact, the company's audit committee, composed of three outside directors, never
met. 1 2 The Commission concluded:
104

[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 80,219 at 85,463.

105 Id.

106 See Sporkin, supra note 90, at 457.
107 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
108 Id. at 88,878.
109 Id
110 Id.

M Id

112 Id at 88,880.

REP.

(CCH)

81,410 (January 16, 1978).
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[O]utside directors should be expected to maintain a general familiarity
with their company's communications with the public. In this way, they
can compare such communications with what they know to be the facts,
and if the facts as they know them are inconsistent, they can see to it, as
stewards for the company, that appropriate revisions or additions be
made.
Moreover, as here, when important events central to the survival of the
company are involved, directors have a responsibility affirmatively to
keep themselves informed of developments within the company and to
seek out the nature of corporate disclosures to determine if adequate dis113
closures are being made ....
Finally, in SEC v. Shzell," 14 the Commission expressed its view that

the mere issuance of a prospectus signed by the directors constituted an
implied representation that the directors were properly carrying out their
functions.' 15 According to the SEC, the outside directors of the mortgage banking and brokerage company had falsely represented that they
were exercising proper control and authority over management, when in
fact they had failed to exercise adequate control and had failed to inquire into business dealings when "they knew or should have known that
' 16
the company's financial condition was worsening." "
The facts in Shiell were similar to those in the Sterhing Homex report
in that the officers of the company had deliberately concealed much of
their conduct from the directors. Despite numerous danger signals and
warnings, however, the directors had failed to take affirmative action to
withdraw a public offering of common stock. Furthermore, although
they had attended board meetings, and in fact received "voluminous"
information about some areas of the company's business, the directors
had failed to establish specific reporting requirements from management
respecting "high risk" loans which constituted a significant part of the
company's assets.11 7 Instead, the Commission alleged, they placed "unwarranted reliance on the company's president . . . using him as their

sole source of all information regarding company activities and operations, and accepting his reports at face value, without even questioning
other officers."' 18

V.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

The accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (FCPA),11 9 codified as Section 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,120 specifically govern the maintenance of corporate books,
113 Id
114

SEC Litigation Release No. 7763, supra note 103.

'1s See Sporkin, supra note 90, at 461-62.
116 [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 383,
''7

at A-9.

Id.

1181d. at A-10.
119 Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. 1, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (1982)).
120 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
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records and accounting controls. 121 Although it applies by its terms only
to "issuers," and not to officers and directors, Section 13(b)(2) necessarily
affects the standard of care to which audit committee members will be
held. It provides as follows:
(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to
section [12] of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports
pursuant to section [15(d)] of this title shall(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general
or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to
maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing
assets at reasonable intervals
and appropriate action is taken with re122
spect to any differences.
Pursuant to the above statutory provisions, the SEC has adopted

Regulation 13b-2,1

23

which does apply directly to audit committee mem-

bers as directors. It provides as follows:
Rule 13b2-I. Falsificationof Accounting Records
No person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified,
any book, record or account subject to section 13 (b) (2) (A) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Rule 1362-2. Issuer's Representations in Connection with the Preparationof Required Reports and Documents
No director or officer of an issuer shall, directly or indirectly,
(a) make or cause to be made a materially false or misleading statement, or
(b) omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state, any material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
to an accountant in connection with (1)any audit or examination of the
financial statements of the issuer required to be made pursuant to this
subpart or (2) the preparation or filing of any document or report required to be4 filed with the Commission pursuant to this subpart or
2
otherwise. 1
121 See generally Baker, Accounting and Accountabiliy. Overview of the Accountig Provisions ofthe

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 809 (1979); ABA Committee on
Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide tothe New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAw. 307 (1978); George & Dundas, Responsibilities of
Domestic Corporate Management under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 865
(1980).
122 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).

123 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b-2 (1983).
124 Id
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SEC Interpretationof Section 13(b) (2) and Regulation 13b-2

According to the SEC, the primary purpose of the FCPA accounting provisions was "to require those public companies which lacked effective internal controls or tolerated unreasonable recordkeeping to comply
with the standards of their better managed peers."' 125 Thus, the Act's
purpose is not to require business records and controls to conform to
some absolute ideal, but rather to assure that the records of a public
company "in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect" disbursements of its assets, and that its internal accounting controls are "sufficient to provide reasonable assurances" that the provision's objectives will
be met. 126 Reasonableness, rather than materiality, is the test to be
applied. 127
According to the Commission, there is an "almost infinite variety"' 128 of acceptable control devices available in a particular business
environment. "Thus, considerable deference properly should be afforded
to the company's . . . business judgments . . .,"29 and so long as the
choice and implementation of control procedures are reasonable under
the circumstances, they remain management's prerogatives and
responsibilities. 130
Under Section 13(b)(2), management and the board have a responsibility to foster integrity among those who operate the control system.
In the Commission's view, it is not likely that control objectives will be
met in the absence of a supportive environment, and the key to an adequate control environment is "an approach on the part of the board and
top management which makes clear what is expected, and that conformity to these expectations will be rewarded while breaches will be
31
punished."1
The Commission has stated that:
The Act's accounting provisions do not require a company or its
senior officials to be the guarantors of the conduct of every company
employee. A failure to correct a known falsification - or a falsification
that reasonably should be known - or any attempt to cover-up a falsification - is, of course, prohibited. But this responsibility arises only
when the individual in question is in some respect responsible for the
records or controls, or otherwise supervises, the activity giving rise to the
violation.
125 SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 17500, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 23,632H at 17,233-8
(January 29, 1981); 17 C.F.R. § 241.17500 (1983).
126 Id. (emphasis in original).
127 Id at 17,233-9. See also SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 15570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,959 at 81,395 (February 15, 1979) ("[Section 13(b)(2)] may provide an
independent basis for enforcement action by the Commission, whether or not violation of the
provisions may lead, in a particular case, to the dissemination of materially false or misleading
information to investors").
128 SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 17500, supra note 125, at 17,234.
129 Id. (emphasis in original).

130 Id
131 Id
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An adequate system of internal controls means that, when such
breaches do arise they will be isolated, rather than systematic, and they
will be subject to a reasonable likelihood of being uncovered in a timely
manner and then remedied promptly. Barring, of course, the participation or complicity of senior company officials in the deed, when discovery and correction expeditiously follow, no failing in the company's
internal controls would have existed. To the contrary, routine discovery
and correction would evidence effective controls. 132

Although the standards for compliance with Section 13(b)(2) are

somewhat ambiguous, the SEC will not render prospective advice on the
applicability of the FCPA to particular factual situations. 133 The legislative history of the FCPA indicates, however, that Congress intended that
attainable standards of reasonableness should be applied in the enforcement of the accounting requirements.' 34 In determining compliance
with the recordkeeping requirements of subsection (A), the applicable
standards are generally recognized accounting practices, and the body of
accounting principles, standards and practices which have substantial

authoritative support and are consistent with the SEC's existing pronouncements regarding accounting requirements. 135 The subsection (B)
control requirements are taken almost word-for-word from the AICPA's
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1.136
To implement section 13(b)(2), the Commission adopted Rules
13b2-11 37 and 13b2-2,1 38 which are codified under Section 13 of the 1934
Act and based in part on a number of other disclosure-related provisions. 13 9 Rule 13b2-1 is intended to "promote compliance with the statutory requirement that issuers have accurate books and records by discouraging persons from falsifying any corporate book, record, or account

subject to.

.

. Section 13(b)(2)(A) and by making individuals [including

officers and directors] directly liable for such conduct.'

140

According to

132 Id at 17,235.
'33 See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 242, 14 SEC DocKET 4 (February 16, 1978).
134 See ABA Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New Section
13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAW. 307, 312
(1978).
135 Id.

136 AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, § 320.28 (1973).
137 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1. See text accompanying notes 123-24.
138 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2. See text accompanying notes 123-24.
139 According to the Commission, Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 are based in part on the following provisions:
(a) Sections 13(a), 13(b)(1) and 15(d) of the Act, which set forth certain periodic
reporting requirements; (b) Section 10(b), which prohibits fraud; (c) Section
14(a), which governs proxy solicitations; (d) Section 20(b), which prohibits unlawful conduct performed by any person "through or by means of any other person"; and (e) Section 20(c), which prohibits any director or officer of, or any
owner of securities issued by, any issuer required to file any document, report or
information under... "the Securities Echange Act without just cause to hinder,
delay or obstruct the making of filing of any such document, report or information . ...

"

SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 15570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
at 81,396 (February 15, 1979).
140 Id

at 81,396-97.

81,959

1984]

AUDIT COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES

the Commission, there is no limitation concerning "material" falsity, and
no scienter requirement, which the Commission believes would be inconsistent with the language of section 13(b)(2)(A). 14 1 Rule 13b2-2 is primarily intended to restore the efficacy of the corporate accountability
system and to encourage boards of directors to excercise their authority
to deal with the problem. 142 The Commission intends the rule to cover
the audit of financial statements, the preparation of required or special
reports to be filed with the Commission, "and any other work performed
by an accountant that culminates in the filing of a document with the
Commission."' 143 Although a materiality requirement is written into.the
rule, the Commission contends that there is no scienter requirement,
requirement is inconsistent with
again because it believes that a scienter
44
the language of Section 13(b)(2).1
Given the lack of any materiality or scienter requirement in Section
13(b)(2), and the Commission's view that scienter is not required to
prove a violation of the rules, audit committee members have particular
cause to be concerned. Section 13(b)(2) and the SEC's rules could be
interpreted to cover violations of conduct codes, lack of supervision by
management or the board, failure to follow internal policies and procedures and countless other areas which often directly concern audit committees. 145 Indeed, the General Counsel of the SEC has stated that
for mandating
Section 13(b) (2) represents one of several possible grounds
46
that all public companies maintain audit committees.1
It should be remembered, however, that because Section 13(b)(2)
applies only to "issuers," and not to officers and directors, audit committee members may be charged only with aiding and abetting an issuer's
Section 13(b)(2) violation. Thus, as a practical matter, some form of scienter is likely to be required. 147 Moreover, despite the Commission's be141 Id at 81,397-98.
142 Id at 81,399.
143 Id
144 Id. at 81,400.
145 See Baker, supra note 121, at 841.
146 See Memorandum of SEC General Counsel, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,535 at 80,181 (March 2, 1978).
147 A number of circuits have adopted a three-tier analysis set forth by the Sixth Circuit in
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975), to determine
whether aider and abetter liability can be imposed. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectine, 700 F.2d 774
(lst Cir. 1983); Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1982); ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909
(2d Cir. 1980); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F2d. 84 (5th Cir. 1975). Under the Coffe.y test, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the primary
party, as distinguished from the secondary aiding and abetting party, committed a securities
law violation; (2) that the defendent had knowledge of the fraud; and (3) that the defendant
rendered "substantial assistance" to the primary violation. 570 F.2d at 48. Thus, even if negligence is the appropriate standard for issuers in the context of § 13(b)(2), it would probably be
insufficient to support a finding of aiding and abetting a § 13(b)(2) violation.
Inaction can be a form of assistance in certain cases, but only where it is shown that the
silence of the accused aider and abetter was consciously intended to aid the securities law violation. See, e.g., Marbury Management, Inc., v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980) (brokerage
firm could not be held liable as "aider and abetter" of its employee's fraudulent activities where
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lief that Rule 13b2-1 lacks a scienter requirement, the words "falsify or
cause to be falsified" strongly imply that something more than negli48
gence might be required.1
B.

SEC Enforcement Actions and Admtistratve Proceedings

To date, all of the cases brought under the FCPA accounting provisions have been brought by the SEC,149 and every action by the Commission has involved officers and inside directors in egregious factual
circumstances where the misconduct was clearly knowing and intentional, or at the very least reckless.' 50 Moreover, the Commission has
never brought a "pure" FCPA action, but has always tacked the Section
13(b)(2) violation onto numerous other substantive violations of the an5
tifraud or reporting provisions of the 1934 Act.' 1
In SECv. Ani'mex Resources Corp. ,152 the first suit brought by the SEC
under the FCPA, the Commission alleged that Animex, a company engaged in coal mining and coal mine leasing, and its former officers, had
misappropriated and diverted at least $1.24 million of corporate assets
by engaging in a number of fraudulent practices, including payments to
a bogus account, kickbacks, and unauthorized salary payments, and that
they had disguised the misappropriations by means of false and improper
accounting in the corporate books and records.' 53 The corporation,
aided and abetted by its president, who was also the chief executive ofcircumstances suggested inadequate supervision and lax control, but not "knowing or intentional misconduct" or equivalently reckless misconduct). For a discussion of aider and abetter
liability under the Securities laws in general, see Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liabi/ity in Securities
Law.- Controlling Person Liabilh'y, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1007, 1022-29 (1983).
148 See Baker, supra note 121, at 834. See also SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 15570, supra note
139, at 81,401 (Commissioner Karmel dissenting) ("falsify" implies an element of deceit).
149 It has not yet been decided whether there is a private right of action under Section
13(b)(2). Although the SEC has taken the position that a private right could properly be implied on behalf of "persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited corporate bribery," see
SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 14478 (February 16, 1978) [Accounting Series Releases Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,264, the Commission's position has been challenged. See,
e.g., Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, 35 Bus. LAw. 311, 315 (1979)("[T]he
legislative history does not reflect any manifested intent that there be an implied private right of
action under Section 13(b)(2)(B) ....
"); Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. A
Private Right of Action?, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 735 (1979)(concluding that a private
right will probably not be found to exist under the FCPA).
150 See SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,214 at 95,873 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (the FCPA actions currently being litigated
by the SEC indicate that it "intends to rely heavily on the Act to address management misfeasance, misuse of corporate assets and other conduct reflecting adversely on management's
integrity").
t5t See, e.g., id, where the SEC charged World-Wide and certain of its officers and inside
directors with violations of the following provisions of the 1934 Act in addition to the alleged
violation of § 13(b)(2) and the regulations thereunder: § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5; § 13(a) and
Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-l1 and 13a-13; §§ 13(d), 14(d)(1), 14(e) and 14(f) and Rule 14f-1;
§ 14(a) and Rules 14a-6 and 15a-9; and 16(a) and Rule 16a-l.
152 11978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,352 (D.D.C. March 9, 1978).
153 Id. at 93,201.
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ficer and a director, was charged with violating Subsections 13(b)(2)(A)
and (B) because it had maintained false entries on the books and records,
and had "failed to devise an adequate accounting control system," in
154
part to further conceal the fraudulent activities.
In SECyv. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd ,155 the SEC sought a permanent injunction against World-Wide and several individuals including Hale, the company's president and chairman of the board, and
Siebert, an employee of a World-Wide subsidiary who was also WorldWide's one-man "audit committee." The Commission alleged violations
of Section 13(b)(2) and numerous other federal securities laws, resulting
from a combination of late filings, lack of internal controls, transactions
unsupported by adequate documentation, and a "total disregard for
156
proper accounting procedures."'
World-Wide's independent auditor had written a letter to Hale expressing "grave concern" over certain accounting procedures and the
lack of internal controls. Despite this official warning, however, nothing
was done to remedy the situation. Instead, the auditor was replaced by
new auditors who also found significant deficiencies in internal controls.
Even when notified of a possible FCPA violation by a law firm hired at
the suggestion of the new auditors, World-Wide did little to change its
methods of operation. Nearly a year later, an SEC accountant concluded that there was still inadequate documentation to support pur15 7
chases, and that internal controls remained inadequate.
The court inferred the following directives from the internal controls provision of the FCPA:
(1) Every company should have reliable personnel, which may require
that some be bonded, and all should be supervised. (2) Account functions should be segregated and procedures designed to prevent errors or
irregularities. The major functions of recordkeeping, custodianship, authorization, and operation should be performed by different people to
avoid the temptation for abuse of these incompatible functions. (3) Reasonable assurances should be maintained that transactions are executed
as authorized. (4) Transactions should be properly recorded in the
firm's accounting records to facilitate control, which would also require
standardized procedures for making accounting entries. Exceptional entries should be investigated regularly. (5) Access to assets of the company should be limited to authorized personnel. (6) At reasonable
intervals, there should be a comparison of the accounting records with
the actual inventory of assets, which would usually involve the physical
taking of inventory, the counting of cash, and the reconciliation of accounting records with the actual physical assets. Frequency of these
comparisons will usually depend on the cost of the process and upon the
materiality of the assets involved. 158
154Id.at 93,204.
155

11982-1983 Transfer Binder]

156 Id at 95,862.
157Id at 95,867.
158

Id at 95,875.

FED. SEC.
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(CCH)

99,214 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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According to the court, Congress was fully aware of cost-effective
considerations, and has demanded only that judgment be excercised in
applying the reasonableness standard. The size and nature of the business, diversity of operations, degree of centralization of financial and operating management, amount of contact by top management with dayto-day operations, and "numerous other circumstances" are factors
which management must consider.159 The court noted what it called the
"all pervasive effect" of the combined failure to act, failure to maintain
adequate records, failure to maintain any type of inventory control,
material omissions and misrepresentations, and other activities, and
found that World-Wide, Hale, and Siebert had violated all the provisions of Section 13(b)(2)(A) and (B) and the SEC's rules promulgated
60

thereunder. 1

It is clear that the Commission believes that proper recordkeeping
and accounting controls are necessary, notwithstanding the FCPA, in order to comply with the other disclosure and reporting requirements of
the Federal Securities Laws.' 6' For example, in In the Matter of Martin E.
Davis,'16 2 the Commission charged Davis, the chief financial officer of
ISC Financial Corporation, and other officers and inside directors of the
company with violating the antifraud and reporting provisions of the
Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that the breakdown of Old Security's
internal controls prevented ISC and Davis from making accurate
financial disclosure, and that Davis had participated in the company's
63
filing of materially inadequate reports with the Commission.1
Although the circumstances which gave rise to the SEC's order in
Davis predated the enactment of the FCPA, the Commission indicated
that the internal control deficiencies in question "would likely have conu64
stituted, in and of themselves, a violation of Section 13(b)(2).'

VI.

Conclusion

Audit committee members occupy a unique position in the eyes of
the SEC. Although, as outside directors, they are not expected to participate in the day-to-day management of the company, they are expected
to be informed, and to play an active role in the business. Moreover, the
Commission expects audit committees to perform a broad array of functions, and will attempt to hold committee members to a very high stan159 Id.
'60 Id at 95,876.
161 See SEC Exchange Act
162 SEC Accounting Series

Rel. No. 15570, supra note 139, at 81,397.
Release No. 267, [Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder]

(CCH) 72,289 (July 2, 1979).
163 Id. at 62,749-75, 62,750.
164 I. at 62,750 n. 10. See also In the Matter of Telex Corp., SEC Exchange Act Rel. No.
18694, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,209 at 85,057 n.7 (April 29, 1982)
(appropriate documentation and control of corporate prerequisites and benefits was not only
required by Section 13(b)(2), but was also necessary to insure that, where required, public disclosure could be made).
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dard of care, at least as to matters within the scope of their
responsibilities.
To meet this standard, committee members must establish procedures to insure an adequate flow of information to the committee. They
must familiarize themselves with the procedures used in maintaining the
company's books, records and accounting controls, and they must be prepared, as representatives of the investors, to provide the protection which
investors might reasonably expect from an audit committee member.
-ROBERT

JAY FORTIN

